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Mandating interactive governance arenas presents itself as an appealing strategy for deter-
mined public policy-makers at the frontier of New Public Governance. However, it also 
confronts researchers and practitioners with a new set of policy execution problems which 
prompts re-examination of one of the oldest research questions in public administration 
research: how and why are the high hopes of central policy-makers (not) translated into 
practice? Through combining insights from the public policy implementation literature, 
network governance literature and theories of multi-actor institutional design, the article 
develops a theoretical perspective for studying top-down implementation of interactive 
governance arenas. The developed perspective enables researchers and practitioners to 
identify a number of critical junctions in the implementation process with important impli-
cations for the final design of the interactive arenas. A longitudinal case-analysis of the 
implementation of ten Local Crime Prevention Councils in one of twelve Danish police 




Today partnerships, networks and other interactive forms of governance are 
widely celebrated by public policy-makers as a means of ensuring effective, dem-
ocratic and innovative public governance (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; Sørensen & 
Torfing, 2007; Torfing et al., 2012; Agger et al., 2015). The surging interest in 
new forms of cross-cutting collaboration, co-creation and co-production (Bovaird, 
2007) has led scholars to suggest that we are in fact witnessing the rise of a whole 
new participatory and interactive design and delivery regime that is currently 
transforming public administration in profound ways. Allegedly the new regime, 
dubbed the New Public Governance (NPG), is emerging as a response to the short-
comings of the bureaucratic public policy and implementation regime of Classical 
Public Administration (CPA) and the more recent market-oriented, managerial re-
gime of New Public Management (NPM) (Osborne, 2006, 2010; Torfing & Tri-
antafillou, 2013; Morgan & Cook, 2014; Lindberg, Czarniawska & Solli, 2015). 
The many promises of cross-sector collaboration advanced in contemporary 
policy discourses across policy fields provide strong incentives for central politi-
cal decision-makers to craft policies that deliberately attempt to shift the balance 
from CPA and NPM to NPG. Rather than formulating and adopting public pro-
grammes, public officials are encouraged to foster and lead interactive governance 
that cuts across silos and prompts public and private actors to come together to 
confront new problems as they arise (Ansell & Gash, 2012; Krogh & Torfing, 
2015; Sørensen, Lidström & Hanssen, 2015; Bockstette et al., 2014). Mandating 
interactive governance arenas is one way of doing so which presents itself as an 
appealing strategy for determined public policy-makers at the frontier of NPG. 
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However, on closer study, mandating interactive governance proves to be a 
perilous policy strategy. If the implementation process is not managed in ways 
that consider the specific dynamics of multi-level, multi-actor interaction in and 
around collaborative governance institutions, the central push for more collabora-
tion may in fact end up worsening collaborative relations between local actors and 
leave them with inefficient and tokenistic governance arrangements. 
Local Crime Prevention Councils (LCPCs) in Denmark are an illustrative case 
of some key policy execution problems pertaining to top-down implementation of 
NPG practices. In order to ensure sustained collaboration between the local police, 
local government and local community organisations, the Danish Ministry of Jus-
tice required the District Police to set up cross-sector collaborative arenas in each 
municipality within the police district following the Danish Police Reform of 
2007. However, newly derived empirical data shows that private actors have been 
formally excluded from 75 of 971 LCPCs, i.e. the vast majority of the councils 
consist solely of public authorities.2 How and why did the noble ambitions of ad-
vancing cross-sector collaboration translate into this? 
This article sets out to develop a theoretical perspective that will deepen our 
understanding of the specific policy execution problems of top-down implemen-
tation of interactive governance arenas and how such problems may be bridled. In 
order to do so, the article first critically examines different schools of policy im-
plementation research and their primary explanations of policy execution prob-
lems. Special attention is paid to their respective fortes and inadequacies for ana-
lysing top-down implementation of interactive governance arenas. Insights from 
the network governance literature are introduced in order to develop the contours 
of a top-down governance perspective on implementation. Second, theories of 
multi-actor institutional design are consulted to grasp the specific dynamics of 
multi-actor governance arrangements and further develop the perspective. Third, 
the perspective is operationalized and applied to the case of the Danish LCPCs in 
order to demonstrate its usefulness in grasping the vertical and horizontal dynam-
ics of multi-level, multi-actor implementation processes. Finally, the article con-
cludes by summing up the lessons learned and reflecting upon the prospects of 
advancing New Pubic Governance through top-down implementation of interac-
tive governance arenas. 
 
Four perspectives on public policy formulation and  
implementation 
In order to understand what is at stake when implementing interactive governance 
arrangements, we are well advised to consult the vast body of implementation re-
search within the field of public administration. I suggest using the well-known 
top-down/bottom-up, government/governance distinctions implicitly or explicitly 
deployed in all policy studies to get a hold of the available perspectives. These 
concepts are intuitive for most public administration researchers; however, for the 





sake of accuracy the following definitions apply. Top-down perspectives focus 
their attention on processes through which policies formulated by central policy-
makers translate into practice through vertical chains of implementation. Bottom-
up perspectives consider how local actors play a key role in both formulating and 
translating policies into practice. Government perspectives are concerned with 
policy formation and implementation in and around formal political institutions 
and public bureaucracies. Governance perspectives are concerned with policy for-
mation and implementation in networks of public and private actors.  
Crossing the two dimensions provides us with four distinct (groupings of) 
perspectives on policy formulation and implementation with each their specific 
set of research interests, assumptions and normative biases: a top-down govern-
ment perspective, a bottom-up government perspective, a bottom-up governance 
perspective, and a top-down governance perspective. A graphic representation of 
the conceptual model is depicted in Figure 1. 
 






















In the following subsections, I will sketch out the four perspectives in terms of 
their key propositions and consider both their value and shortcomings for the anal-
ysis of multi-level, multi-actor implementation processes. 
 
The top-down government perspective 
Following the seminal work of Pressman and Wildavsky (1973), a top-down gov-
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years. This perspective is mainly concerned with the failure of realizing the orig-
inal goals of government programmes as defined in the policy statutory.  Any 
opinions, ideas and perspectives of lower level actors that diverge from those for-
mulated by central policy-makers are seen as illegitimately distorting elements 
that should be repressed. From this perspective, implementation failure occurs due 
to (too) long implementation chains with (too) many communication links and 
potential veto-points, which threatens to obscure the policy as formulated by cen-
tral decision-makers. In order to decrease the risk of original policy goals being 
distorted, the number of actors involved in implementation should be reduced 
(Pressman & Wildawsky, 1973). Moreover, central policy-makers should state 
policy goals clearly (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1983); develop detailed means-ends 
schemes (Elmore, 1982); and place the responsibility for implementation in an 
agency sympathetic with the intent of the policy to be implemented (Sabatier, 
1986). 
The top-down government perspective points to the fact that shifts in levels 
may cause shifts in the form and content of the policy in question, especially if 
multiple agencies are involved. The perspective hence prompts researchers to pay 
attention to potential policy alterations occurring at each new level in the imple-
mentation process.  
By defining any alterations to the original policy formulation as a failure, 
however, the perspective effectively disregards the concerns and potentially valu-
able contributions of lower-level actors. In brief, the importance of voice, owner-
ship and co-design for successful policy implementation is neglected. 
 
The bottom-up government perspective 
Critiques of the basic assumptions of the top-down perspective were voiced in the 
late 1970’s and early 1980’s, which eventually led to the heated top-down/bottom-
up debate in implementation studies (Linders & Peters, 1987; Lester et al., 1987). 
Scholars deploying a bottom-up government perspective pointed to the fact that 
public employees in the frontline are not simply loyal implementers that do what 
they are told as long as the message is clear; they effectively make policy based 
on their perceptions, their situation and own self-interest. Lipsky (1980) showed 
how street-level bureaucrats such as policemen, teachers and social workers make 
discretionary decisions, establish routines and devise strategies to cope with the 
cross-pressures of conflicting goals and norms, large caseloads, inadequate re-
sources and uncertainties. This may be done by routinizing services, controlling 
users or lowering demand. 
The bottom-up government perspective recognizes the existence of vertical 
conflicts of interests between levels while granting some degree of legitimacy to 
the concerns of actors operating on lower levels. Policy analysts as well as central 
policy-makers are thus prompted to consider the interests and (limited) resources 
of implementing actors.  





Being less concerned with the acts of central policy-makers, however, the lit-
erature written from the bottom-up government perspective rarely explicitly con-
siders how public managers may contribute to successful implementation. Like 
the top-down government perspective, potentially positive contributions by local 
actors are hence difficult to track: local influence must be avoided rather than cul-
tivated. Finally, the perspective solely focuses on the vertical dimension of public 
bureaucracy and has little to say about cross-sector policy design and implemen-
tation.  
 
The bottom-up governance perspective 
In the early 1980’s, Benny Hjern and colleagues introduced a bottom-up govern-
ance perspective on implementation with their key concept of implementation 
structures (Hjern & Porter, 1981; Hjern & Hull, 1982). Implementation structures 
are defined as interconnected clusters of firms, governments and associations that 
come together within the framework of public programmes “almost irrespective 
of mandates from the central levels” (Hjern & Porter, 1981: 215). The perspective 
views such inter-organisational networks as an important resource for the imple-
mentation process. Local adaptation of public policies is seen as desirable as it 
ensures a better fit between public policy and the specific needs and capabilities 
of the local community. Hence, central policy-makers should not seek to avoid 
substantial variation in policy delivery across locales; rather they must expect and 
appreciate it as it reflects the adjustment to local conditions informed by the con-
textual knowledge of the pool of organisations from which the implementation 
structure is formed. Exponents of the perspective thus recommend flexible policy 
implementation that allows for considerable local autonomy.  
The bottom-up government perspective recognizes the existence of private 
actors and their importance for shaping public policies, especially at the local 
level. Taking the lack of control by central authorities as a basic condition, it 
makes an important analytical contribution by re-conceptualizing new policies as 
triggers of complex multi-actor interactions rather than well-defined programmes 
that should be loyally implemented according to central plans.  
However, while the government perspectives delineated above were biased 
towards a negative interpretation of alteration made by local actors, the bottom-
up governance perspective tends to over-emphasize the positive contribution of 
local actors. Hence it easily ends up surrendering control of policy to implement-
ers. The perspective either presupposes the willing cooperation of local network 
actors in realizing central policy goals or, in cases where vertical conflict arises, 
grants privilege to the interests of the local actors by conceptualizing alterations 
as necessary and desirable adaptations to local conditions. Hence, it tends to ne-
glect the negative aspects of local influence stemming from bias of local coali-
tions, conflicting interests between local actors and established power structures. 
For that reason it does not consider viable strategies for handling such situations. 







The top-down governance perspective 
During the 1990’s, the government-governance debate really took off and protag-
onists of the governance perspective such as Kooiman (1993) and Rhodes (1994, 
1996, 1997) argued the emergence of more differentiated polities and increasingly 
complex social-political arrangements. Under these conditions, the very term ‘im-
plementation’ became associated with a lost age of Classical Public Administra-
tion and the amount of public administration research directly using the term 
started to regress (Hupe & Sætren, 2014). While the first generation of interactive 
governance literature focused on governance networks as distinct governance 
mechanisms differing from hierarchies and markets (e.g. Marin & Mayntz, 1991; 
March & Rhodes, 1992), a second generation emerged in the late 1990’s and early 
2000s which introduced network management and metagovernance as central con-
cepts (Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan, 1997; Pierre, 2000; Sørensen & Torfing, 
2009). Even though the label might not sit well with the authors, we may use their 
theories to distil a top-down governance perspective on policy formulation and 
implementation.  
The top-down governance perspective recognizes the legitimacy of central 
policy-makers to formulate policies and the importance of ensuring the fulfilment 
of the policy objectives formulated by political leadership (like the top-down gov-
ernment perspective). At the same time, the links between local governmental ac-
tors, private businesses and community organisations are seen as important for 
mobilizing knowledge and competencies that can help qualify the policies in ques-
tion and facilitate successful implementation (like the bottom-up governance per-
spective). Local actors are, however, not simply conceptualized as benevolent and 
conductive to policy implementation by definition, but as situated actors with par-
ticular goals, interests and world-views that may obstruct the policies coming 
‘from above’ (like the bottom-up government perspective).  
Hence, the top-down governance perspective recognizes both the vertical and 
horizontal dimension of implementation processes as well as the need to encour-
age constructive participation from both public agencies and private stakeholders. 
It is based on the premise that the concerns and interests of key (public and private) 
stakeholders must be served by a policy (or governance arrangement) for it to ef-
fective. For that reason, strengthening public policy-makers’ hierarchical control 
over the process (as proposed by the top-down government perspective) is not 
seen as a viable strategy for ensuring successful implementation. In fact various 
forms of command-and-control are posited to be outright counterproductive in 
multi-organisational settings since the operationally autonomous actors will with-
draw from the process if other actors try to force their will on them (Huxham & 
Vangen, 2005). Government actors must rather govern through incentive struc-
tures, facilitative process management and mediation between potentially ‘reluc-
tant partners’ (cf. Stoker, 1991). 
While the interactive governance literature, particularly theories of meta-
governance and network management, offers valuable insights on how to manage 





complex processes of multi-actor policy-making, a number of assumptions imbed-
ded in the perspective may cause blind spots in the analysis of multi-level, multi-
actor implementation processes. First, it tends to assume that public and private 
managers are interested in, and to some extent able to, act as more or less neutral, 
facilitative metagovernors that ensure the inclusion of relevant actors and support 
their interaction in order to reach common goals. By doing so, it fails to recognize 
the metagovernor as a situated actor with specific interests in the composition and 
agenda of the governance arena that may be a barrier for achieving well-function-
ing networks. Second, the perspective tends to focus on how a single metagover-
nor/network manager may assemble and direct networks. By doing so, it fails to 
capture the multi-actor dynamics of institutional design and management pro-
cesses. Third, it sometimes assumes a strategic rationale in the design of new are-
nas that neglects the power plays and interest-based negotiations between multiple 
metagovernors.  
In order to make up for these shortcomings and make the top-down govern-
ance perspective more apt for studying implementation of mandated governance 
arenas, we will now turn to theories of multi-actor institutional design. 
 
Multi-actor institutional design of mandated governance arenas 
Interactive design theory asserts that institutional designs are rarely derived at out 
of rational, strategic and benevolent considerations of how best to attain collective 
goals and optimize task performance. Rather multi-actor design processes are 
shaped by the fact that new governance institutions are likely to alter the distribu-
tion of resources and relative influence of key actors.  
As Erik-Hans Klijn and Joop Koppenjan (2006) points out, multi-actor insti-
tutional design often unfolds as “a negotiation game in a garbage can-type con-
text” characterized by “complicated and lengthy procedures” taking place in an 
“uncertain institutional environment” where the final design must be interpreted 
as “the result of the process of pushing and pulling between parties” (p. 155). From 
this perspective, each attempt at changing the composition and set of network rules 
is ex post a power struggle structured by past interactions, choices and power re-
lations, which leads to the institutionalization of distributive advantages, the mo-
bilization of bias and the exclusion of certain actors, interests and issues (ibid.: 
146-148).  
As Jens Blom-Hansen (1997) asserts, the collective output of multi-actor in-
stitutional design processes may be compromised if and when a ‘logic of one-
sided distributional advantage’ kicks in, where powerful actors seek to create and 
shape the new institutions as a means for pursuing their own interests and gain 
strategic advantages at the expense of less powerful actors. Within this logic of 
action, “actors who fundamentally disagree with the purposes served by the insti-
tutions and who are harmed by their effects […] pursue a strategy of crippling the 
institutions as much as possible”, which may very well lead to “rationally strange 
and inefficient institutions” (ibid.: 680). The design of new arenas is hence shaped 






by the different interests and orientations of the actors involved and may fall vic-
tim to situations where one or more of the designers deploy defensive strategies 
that directly seek to cripple the new institutions.  
Furthermore, Erik-Hans Klijn (2005) notes that “lengthy implementation pro-
cesses typically have unanticipated consequences as actors attempt to adapt insti-
tutional reforms to their own needs” (p. 334). These unanticipated consequences, 
we may add, could run counter to the central policy intent as well as the interests 
of the implementing designers themselves. 
The theoretical exposition allows us to formulate three propositions on the 
dynamics and specific challenges pertaining to top-down implementation of inter-
active governance arrangements. 
First, local actors with a vested (self-)interest in the institutional set-up of a 
given policy field cannot be assumed to favour the establishment of new govern-
ance arenas mandated by central government. On the contrary, the fact that the 
proposed governance arena has not already been established by the local actors 
themselves may well indicate that the existing power structures and interdepend-
ency relations do not support such interactive governance mechanism. Especially 
in situations where established regime actors have not been involved in the process 
leading up to the central initiation of the new arenas, the implementation process 
may be hampered by defensive strategies that seek to cripple the new arenas as 
much as possible. 
Second, when a governance arrangement is mandated by law, lead agencies 
may be tempted to (re-)design the institution to fit their own purposes during the 
implementation process, e.g. by ascribing formal powers to the arena, excluding 
other actors from the arena, and/or assigning leadership roles to themselves. Since 
the voluntary participation of other organisations is needed for collaborative are-
nas to produce anything of value, they may, however, cripple the new governance 
arena by doing so. Since the public agencies and private actors in the field cannot 
dissolve the mandated arena – even if they do not find it to be mutually beneficial 
– dissatisfied actors are left with the option of pursuing more defensive strategies 
of de facto weakening the significance of the new arena by withdrawing compe-
tencies and other resources. 
Third, if new governance arenas are conceptualized as formal bodies that are 
able to make binding decisions affecting those involved as well as others – rather 
than platforms for voluntary interaction between operationally autonomous actors 
– then the lead agency will be inclined to exclude other actors since such exclusion 
will enhance rather than diminish the lead agency’s control over the arena and its 
domain. We may further hypothesize that this situation is most likely to occur if 
and when public agencies act as sole designers. Hence if private stakeholders are 
not involved in the design of a new interactive governance arena that they are 
expected to participate in – and if their interests have not been brought into the 
design phase by any other means – then there is a greater risk of developing bu-
reaucratic designs that limit their influence and active participation on the arena. 





The three propositions point to the fact that it is highly important who are 
involved (and who are not involved) as partners and co-designers in the imple-
mentation process. Process design strategies (Klijn, 2005) may be deployed in or-
der to structure the implementation process in ways that build support and broad 
ownership to the new governance arena; ensure the inclusion of multiple perspec-
tives in the design phase; and avoid policy capture by a single agency. This may 
be done by distributing leadership roles among more than one agency from the 
outset; by requiring lead agencies to consult relevant stakeholders on the institu-
tional design; and by setting up pay-off structures that will encourage public and 
private stakeholders to participate. Implementation managers may also deploy 
process management strategies that help parties bridge their differences and avoid 
destructive conflicts; facilitate the actual inclusion of different interests and per-
spectives; and ensure that the overall policy objectives are not lost of sight. 
Whether or not such strategies have been pursued – and how the implementation 
process design has impacted on the interactive design process – is an important 
focal point for policy-makers and policy analysts who wish to bolster and/or un-
derstand such processes. 
 
Applying the perspective to the case of the LCPCs  
In order to illustrate how the synthesis between implementation theory, network 
governance theory and multi-actor design theory can help us understand and ex-
plain policy execution problems pertaining to the top-down implementation of in-
teractive governance arenas, I will proceed to apply the theoretical perspective to 
the case of the Local Crime Prevention Councils (LCPCs) in Denmark. It is be-
yond the scope of the article to provide a comprehensive analysis of the specific 
case in question, yet alone to make generalizable proclamations based on the re-
sults. The case analysis simply serves as an initial (and cursory) attempt at putting 
the perspective to work that illustrates the applied use of the perspective. 
Before embarking on the case analysis itself, a few words on case selection 
and data collection methods should be stated. Hopefully these methodological re-
flections can inspire other researchers to apply and develop the perspective in and 
through empirical case analysis.  
 
Case selection 
The illustrative case is strategically selected to exhibit policy problems pertaining 
to top-down implementation of interactive governance arenas. Contemporary po-
lice reforms in Western Europe seem particularly suited as critical cases for show-
casing and investigating some of these problems since they tend to be “firmly em-
bedded in a vertical, state-oriented vision” (Terpstra and Fyfe, 2013: 6) while at 
the same time placing significant emphasis on community-oriented policing and 
multi-agency collaboration (Verhage et al., 2010). We can hence expect to find 
tensions between logics of vertical government and horizontal governance to be 
particularly prevalent in such reforms. 






As mentioned in the introduction, the LCPCs were introduced as a part of the 
Danish police reform of 2007 to advance collaborative crime prevention between 
the local police, local government and local community organisations. As such it 
must be considered a least likely case in terms of successful implementation of 
interactive governance arenas. Moreover, the specific institutional conditions of 
the Danish LCPC case also satisfy the conditions advanced in the theoretical 
framework (see section 5.1 for further explanation). 
In order to conduct an analysis of the implementation process from top to 
bottom, one of 12 police districts was strategically selected for further investiga-
tion. The selected police district is distinct in the sense that it started out by limit-
ing the number of community organisations in its ten LCPCs before redesigning 
the councils and expanding the number of community organisations. Today it is 
the only police district that has included community actors in all of its LCPCs.3 
The specific police district was selected since the longitudinal variance in the 
LCPC design allows for an exploration of both conductive and constraining fac-
tors.  
Based on the analysis it is not possible to generalize the findings to other po-
lice districts with different implementation trajectories. However, the analysis 
points to important focal points that should be subjected to further studies in other 
Danish police districts and in other cases of top-down implementation of interac-
tive governance arenas. As mentioned, the case analysis is conducted with the 
purpose of illustration.  
 
Data collection methods 
A combination of forward and backward mapping (Elmore, 1982) was used to 
reconstruct the implementation process and identify critical moments of (re-)de-
sign. Three steps were taken. 
First, written material from the process was gathered through public sources, 
formal requests of access to records and documents, and direct contacts in the 
police. The obtained documents were scanned for references to other documents 
which were then specifically requested; this was done until no further documents 
could be identified.  
Second, the gathered material of parliamentary committee proceedings, min-
isterial directives, LCPC rules of procedure, and internal working documents was 
systematically reviewed and classified according to time and level of application 
(national/regional/local). The classification served to recreate a vertical imple-
mentation chain ranging from top to bottom in a linear progression over time. 
Third, semi-structured interviews were conducted with key actors who had 
been involved in the design negotiations at each step in the implementation pro-
cess. The theoretical perspective prompts us to obtain insights on the motivations, 
interests and agendas of the actors involved in crafting the design of the new arena, 
which served as the main purpose of the interviews. 





Four critical moments of (re-)design were identified and expounded in this 
way (see table 1). 
In the following section I will first provide some background on the specific 
institutional context; then review each moment in terms of its main actors, their 
considerations and the resulting design features; and finally consider the imple-
mentation process as a whole. 
 
Table 1: Overview of Critical Moments of Redesign in the Implementation Process 
Critical 
Moment  
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The institutional governance context: The SSP cooperation 
The theoretical prompts us to survey the institutional environment in order to un-
derstand the established positions of key actors in the field and how the new gov-
ernance arena may alter the distribution of resources and relative influence of the 
actors.  
Denmark has a long tradition for collaborative crime prevention. Since the 
1970’s, the so-called SSP cooperation between Schools, Social services and Police 






has formed the backbone of Danish crime prevention (Kankaala, 2015). The pri-
mary objective of the SSP is to prevent juvenile crime among children and youth 
in the age of 6-18 years old through individual case work, targeted interventions 
towards groups at risk and general education and guidance to the age group at 
large (Ssp.kk.dk). 
Taken as a whole, the SSP has developed into a comprehensive and well-or-
ganized institution with collaborative forums on multiple levels. While the exact 
way of organizing the SSP cooperation varies across locales, all Danish munici-
palities has adopted the scheme in some form (Danish National Board of Social 
Services, 2008). Local government typically has a significant amount of resources 
bound up in the SSP structure. Most places local government employ several 
fulltime SSP coordinators and counsellors. A municipal steering committee 
headed by politicians and/or administrators from local government typically coor-
dinate the local SSP action groups (ibid.). While the police are typically repre-
sented in the steering committees, local government remains the lead actor in the 
cooperation. 
As we shall see, the struggle over the division of labour and relative im-
portance of the new LCPCs vis-a-vis the established SSP institution was pivotal 
when national and local actors were to implement and design the new governance 
arrangement. The implementation of the LCPC’s coincided with two major struc-
tural reforms that impacted on the hitherto existing institutional set-up: the 2007 
Police Reform and 2007 Local Government Reform. The Police Reform reduced 
the number of police districts from 54 districts to 12 districts, and the Local Gov-
ernment Reform reduced the number of municipalities from 271 municipalities to 
98 municipalities.  
While the implementation of the LCPCs took place in a policy field with long 
traditions of inter-agency collaboration and clear divisions of labour between the 
key actors, the two structural reforms created a new and temporarily uncertain 
institutional environment where the future organisation of crime prevention in the 
new and larger districts and municipalities, including the prime institutions of co-
ordination, was yet to be defined. The institutional conditions were hence conduc-
tive to power-ridden negotiations and attempts at expanding, defending or solidi-
fying the individual agencies’ relative influence and control over resources 
through institutional design of the new arenas (cf. section 3 above).  
 
Spring of 2006: General policy of the LCPCs (National level) 
A few months before the police reform bill was to be passed in parliament, the 
prospect of fewer and much larger police districts triggered widespread public 
concern that the local anchorage of policing would dwindled and that the collab-
orative ties would suffer (Balvig, Holmberg & Nielsen, 2011: 47). The introduc-
tion of so-called District Councils in each of the new police districts, where the 
District Police Commissioner meets with the Mayors of the municipalities in the 
district at least four times a year, was not enough to dampen the concerns. Mayors 





from peripheral municipalities criticized the fact that no main police station would 
be placed in their municipality and started exerting political pressure through the 
national parliamentary parties who also had considerable interests in local politics.  
In the first reading of the bill in the parliamentary Legal Committee in mid-
Marts 2006, the social-democratic member of the committee declared that:  
 
The presence of police in local communities will be weakened if the 
bill concerning the new District Councils is not supplemented with a 
new local structure, where the police, the municipal authorities, the 
SSP employees and for instance the Night Ravens [non-profit street 
outreach association] and other local networks can strengthen the pre-
vention of crime. (Ft.dk, 2006) 
 
Later in the same round of negotiation, the more general concern was translated 
into a specific policy proposal by the same spokesperson:  
 
Would it be possible to establish new crime preventive councils around 
the prospective sub-stations that were given the task of strengthening 
the prevention of crime and mobilize the local community organisa-
tions, schools, police and other authorities for a far better prevention 
of crime in these areas? (ibid.)  
 
The LCPCs were formally adopted as official policy with the support of the major 
parties in parliament in a two-page long ministerial answer to a question posed by 
one of the reform partners in the Legal Committee two weeks before passing the 
reform bill. The answer states that:  
 
…the Ministry of Justice finds it to be a natural task of the District 
Police Commissioners to establish local collaboration forums (“local 
councils”) in the individual municipalities with representatives from 
the police, local government and the local community. (Danish Minis-
try of Justice, 2006) 
 
The written answer is formulated within a relatively short time span in the Minis-
try of Justice and only involves a few requirements and guidelines for the design 
of the new collaborative forums. It states that the primary purposes of the councils 
is to advance collaborative crime problem-solving at a local level; to ensure sus-
tained contact between the police and the local community; and to translate the 
general frames and goals of the Police District into practice. The District Police 
Commissioner is imbued with the power to define the specific tasks of the councils 
and the Local Police Commander is expected to prepare and lead the council meet-
ings with the aim of ensuring that the local police will get the widest possible 
knowledge of local developments. 






As such, the statutory grants both a privileged design position to the District 
Police Commissioners (in practice the police as such) and a privileged leadership 
position to the Local Police Commander. Hence, the implicit implementation pro-
cess design grants the police the main responsibility for convening and defining 
the agenda of the new arenas.  
 
Fall of 2006: Ascription of formal decision-making powers (National level) 
During the fall of 2006, a crucial report for the design of the LCPCs is completed. 
The report is composed by a working group under the National Police consisting 
of police officers from the Local Police (4), municipal employees from the Na-
tional SSP Council (2), and experts from the Danish Crime Prevention Council 
(2). 
In the report, published internally on the Danish police intranet in February 
2007, a quite radical redesign of the LCPCs occurs. The report sets out to ensure 
a clear distribution of roles between old and new collaborative forums. To serve 
that end, the report recommends a three-layered structure where: 1) the District 
Council serves as the strategic forum for leadership of all collaborative crime pre-
vention in the district (the strategic level); 2) the LCPCs are responsible for coor-
dinating all collaborative crime prevention in the municipality (the operative 
level); and 3) the local arenas for collaboration such as the local SSP action groups 
execute the action plans (the tactical level).  
The statutory LCPC task of translating the general frames and goals of the 
Police District into practice is now elevated to a central organizing principle of an 
entire collaborative crime prevention structure. The police hold the position of 
lead organisation in both the strategic District Council and the operative LCPCs. 
In the proposed governance structure, the well-established SSP institution led by 
local government is all of a sudden subsumed under the new police-led govern-
ance institutions.  
The LCPCs are now ascribed both formal decision-making powers and re-
source allocation powers. Every year, each LCPC should craft three types of plans: 
1) a local action plan that coordinates all collaborative crime prevention activities 
in the municipality based on the strategic plan of the District Council and the local 
crime prevention needs; 2) a local action plan that defines the activities of the local 
police concerning law enforcement and police-counselling on security issues; and 
3) a plan for the distribution of resources for competence development around 
crime prevention in the municipality.  
The composition of the LCPCs largely goes by without mentioning apart from 
the referenced wording in the statutory. Community organisations are still as-
sumed to be a part of the LCPCs. It is pointed out specifically that the head of the 
SSP cooperation in the municipality should participate in the LCPCs due to the 
(newly ascribed) formal role of the forum. 
At first sight, this redesign ostensibly strengthens community participation in 
the new governance arrangements since the new collaborative forums are given a 





more central role in the crime prevention structure and endowed with formal de-
cision-making and resource allocation powers. However, the theoretical frame-
work allows us to see how this redesign in fact may serve to complicate cross-
sector collaboration and de facto limit community influence. 
The idea that the police-led District Council sets strategic goals for the 
LCPCs, who will then craft local action plans for the SSP to follow, rests on a 
hierarchical logic of government. It ignores the fact that interactive governance 
relies on the willingness of operationally autonomous organisations to enter into 
agreements on joint action. If forced to follow police-led decisions taken else-
where when interacting on the arena, other public and private actors are likely to 
either withdraw from the arena or to pursue defensive strategies of crippling the 
arena. 
As we shall see next, the fatal redesign promotes a logic of one-sided distri-
butional advantage where public actors seek to retain control of the policy field by 
limiting the number of participating private actors. 
 
Spring of 2007: Curtailment of community participation (District level) 
At the district level, the District Police first responds to the national redesign with 
a defensive strategy that aims to shield itself from external influence on police 
priorities. It is speculated that a forum with formal powers will enable local com-
munity actors to “take revenge” following the centralizing police reform and force 
the police to deal with neighborhood-specific issues (interview with Police Com-
missioner). As a response, the District Police draws up a design proposal to be 
discussed with the Local Governments in the district. In order to inhibit commu-
nity actors from imposing tasks on the police, formal voting procedures are intro-
duced and the number of participating community actors is limited to three: 
 
It was implied that the Local Councils were to have some form of in-
fluence on the local priorities of the police. […] The voting procedures 
were a precautionary measure. We shielded ourselves. Because we 
were not sure what we were signing up for (Police Commissioner, in-
terview). 
 
Having ensured the majority of public actors in the councils, the District Police by 
and large adopted the District Council-LCPC-SSP structure from the national pol-
icy report in the design proposal. It is, however, slightly changed to the advantage 
of the police: While the LCPCs should not craft any action plans for the local 
police, they should do so for the SSP. It is thus suggested that the existing SSP 
coordination councils are replaced by, or subsumed under, the LCPCs.  
The proposed District Council-LCPC-SSP structure makes Local Govern-
ment react with great skepticism. Local Government has two objections. Firstly, 
the proposed design is seen to shift the power-balance from Local Government to 
the police: 
 






The police said: “Let the Local Councils be the locus of all collabora-
tion between police and Local Government.” That was when we had 
to put on the breaks. Suddenly they were closing down our SSP organ-
isation. […] They wanted to transfer decision-making power from the 
political and administrative level in the municipalities to the police sta-
tion. We didn’t want that. It is life blood we are dealing with here (Mu-
nicipal civil servant A, interview). 
 
Secondly, the proposed design is seen to give private community organisations 
too big of a say on the coordinated prevention of crime and thus the priorities of 
Local Government: 
 
When the police introduced the idea that the Local Councils should 
govern the prevention of crime and the municipal SSP funds, we 
simply had to tell them: “Forget it!” We cannot give a Local Council 
involving community actors the decision-making authority over Local 
Government. It probably wouldn’t be legal at all, and it definitely 
wouldn’t be functional (Municipal civil servant B, interview). 
 
The worries of both police and Local Government that the new forum would give 
civil society actors too big of a say in deciding on the priorities of public authori-
ties leave the parties with two design options: remove the formal decision-making 
power from the LCPCs or exclude civil society actors from the arena. The police 
and Local Government agree to wear both belts and braces by removing all formal 
decision-making powers of the LCPCs and ensuring their own majority in the 
councils with a 3-3-3 composition (three representatives from police, local gov-
ernment, and civil society, respectively). 
The design implemented in 2007 is hence shaped by very different logics, 
interests and ideas than the ones giving birth to the LCPC initiative. The LCPCs 
were conceived as a set of collaborative governance institutions that were to en-
sure local anchorage of policing and bolster cross-sector collaboration on crime 
prevention. Now it is about keeping otherwise resourceful civil society organisa-
tions at bay in order to limit community power over the public authorities. 
According to the theoretical framework advanced above, however, we can 
expect that the removal of formal decision-making power from the arena may pave 
the way for greater community participation and collaboration in the long run. 
That is exactly what happens when the design of the LCPCs in the district is eval-
uated three years later and eventually changed once again in 2010.  
 





Spring of 2010: Expansion of community participation (District level) 
After some time, the local designers realize that the formal exclusion of other ac-
tors only made sense within the bureaucratic government design proposed by the 
District Police on the basis of the national policy report: 
 
Our initial fear was gone. We could now see that it was not about tell-
ing the police what to do. […] We then said: Okay then, let all civil 
society actors who want to participate do so (Police Commissioner, 
interview). 
 
The reasons for limiting the number of community actors had evaporated when 
formal decision-making powers were withdrawn from the arena (and actions try-
ing to force the police to make specific priorities had proven to be absent in 
praxis). It was now decided to include up to eight community organisations in 
each council. 
 At the same time, the status of the appointed community organisations was 
changed from standing members to ad hoc participants to be called in for meetings 
if the Local Police Commander deems them relevant for the issues to be discussed 
at the given meeting. In actual fact, however, all the formally appointed commu-
nity organisations are invited for all meetings: 
 
Today everyone is invited for all meetings in order to ensure continu-
ity. It is the logical conclusion since no one formally decides anything. 
Formal decisions are made by the local sheriff, Local Government or 
whoever has the authority on a given issue (Municipal civil servant A, 
interview). 
 
The final result of the implementation process in the District was a forum where 
no one formally decides anything, but where everyone can join.  
 
The LCPC Implementation Process from Mandate to Final Design 
The LCPC implementation process exhibits the potentially crippling effects of 
power-ridden design negotiations that: i) take place in times of institutional tur-
moil; ii) are structured by an unfavorable (top-down government) implementation 
design; and, as a result, iii) involve policy capture by the lead agency, redesigns 
based on hierarchical and formalistic logics of government, and power strategies 
based on a logic of one-sided distributional advantage.  
The theoretical propositions on conductive top-down governance policy de-
signs advanced above enable us to see how tensions were intensified rather than 
alleviated by the statutory LCPC policy design (spring of 2006). The policy was 
an outcome of political negotiations between national politicians and did not go 
through a hearing or any other forms of deliberative process among relevant public 






and private stakeholders before it was adopted. No other ministries than the Min-
istry of Justice were involved and the initial phase involved no stakeholder influ-
ence, awareness or ownership. The sole responsibility for implementing and lead-
ing the LCPCs was placed with the police without any obligations to consult rel-
evant stakeholders on the design or the setting up of any pay-off structures to en-
courage public and private stakeholders to participate in the design process. Hence 
the risk of both policy capture and LCPC designs based on a formalistic logic of 
government was imminent in the process design from the outset.  
Following the theoretical perspective, the fatal redesign occurring in the na-
tional policy report under the auspices of the National Police (fall of 2006) can be 
interpreted as the outcome of an (unchecked) power strategy on the part of police. 
The police make use of their privileged design position to expand their influence 
vis-à-vis other public and private actors by turning the police-led LCPCs into for-
mal steering committees for already established collaborative arenas at the com-
munity level.  As a response, the local actors react with crippling strategies by 
severely curtailing the formal inclusion of community actors in the new govern-
ance structure (spring of 2007).  
After some years, a logic of governance enters the design process, which 
makes the inclusion of (more) community actors a means for increasing the power 
and practical utility of the forums (spring of 2010). This is conditioned upon the 
fact that the institutional environment has stabilized and policy learning has oc-
curred: no formal decision-making powers have been granted to the LCPCs ‘from 
above’ and interaction with community actors in the councils has proven that no 
attempts are made at forcing the local police or local government representatives 
to act against their will ‘from below’. 
Taken as a whole, the LCPC case analysis has illustrated the challenges pro-
posed in the theoretical framework. It has shown how top-down implementation 
of interactive governance arenas may be compromised by active resistance from 
local actors with a vested interest in the existing institutional set-up; by lead 
agency attempts at redesigning new arenas to fit their own purposes; and by hier-
archical and formalistic logics of government that turn arenas into formal bodies 
able to make binding decisions affecting those involved as well as others.  
 
Conclusions 
Mandating interactive governance arenas presents itself as an appealing strategy 
for central policy-makers in an age of New Public Governance (NPG). As this 
article has argued, however, it also confronts researchers and practitioners with a 
new set of policy execution problems that prompts us to re-examine some of the 
earliest research questions in public administration research and consider new and 
more suitable strategies for managing public policy implementation. 





The theoretical perspective on top-down implementation of interactive gov-
ernance arenas developed in this article incorporates insights from network gov-
ernance literature and theories of multi-actor institutional design. It posits that the 
final output of the implementation process, i.e. the design of the mandated arena 
in question, must be interpreted as the result of more or less overt power struggle 
between situated actors who attempt to expand, defend or solidify their relative 
influence and control over resources. It suggests that the blatant use of offensive 
and defensive power strategies deployed within a logic of one-sided distributional 
advantage is likely to cripple the interactive governance arenas in their ability to 
serve as platforms for inter-agency coordination and cross-sector collaboration. 
The risk of failed implementation is accelerated in times of institutional turmoil 
where the involved parties find themselves in a situation with high levels of un-
certainty in terms of future role divisions and resource allocations.  
The article has suggested that policy execution problems may be bridled by 
deploying appropriate implementation design and management strategies. Involv-
ing relevant stakeholders early on the process, distributing leadership roles among 
several agencies and mediating between the involved parties during the imple-
mentation process lowers the risks of policy capture by a single agency and design 
negotiations proceeding from a logic of one-sided distributional advantage. The 
need for implementation management can be expected to be particularly pertinent 
in polities and policy fields populated by strong public actors who, more or less 
intentionally, easily end up crowding out other relevant stakeholders. 
It follows from the theoretical assertions that polities, policy areas and public 
agencies with long histories of interactive governance and cross-sector collabora-
tion are more apt for top-down implementation of interactive governance arenas. 
The risk of formalistic government designs decreases if the involved parties are 
accustomed to cross-sector collaboration between operationally autonomous ac-
tors. However, policy-makers, implementation managers and researchers should 
be aware that such experience is no guarantee that agencies will refrain from de-
ploying offensive power strategies in the hope of expanding their relative influ-
ence in the field if and when the opportunity arises. 
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Notes 
1 Of the 98 Danish municipalities, all have established one LCPC except for: the municipalities of 
Copenhagen, Dragør and Tårnby in the Capital Region, which were exempted due to an already well-
established structure of local committees; the municipality of the island of Læsø, which was deemed 
too small for an LCPC; and the municipality of the island of Bornholm, which decided to establish 
four LCPCs instead of one. This makes a total of 97 LCPCs. 
2 The data on the composition of the LCPCs was collected in the spring of 2015 by Danish National 
Police in collaboration with the researcher. 
3 Analysing the data on the present composition of the LCPCs, we find that one police district has 
included community organisations in all of its local councils, three districts have included commu-
nity members in some of their councils, and one district has included private citizens in all of their 
councils. The remaining seven police districts have not included community members or private citi-
zens in any of their LCPCs. 
 
